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Short Integer Solution: Difference between revisions

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Short Integer Solution (SIS) is an average-case problem, which was introduced in 1996 by Miklós Ajtai.<ref>Ajtai, Miklós. [https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/237814.237838 Generating hard instances of lattice problems]. ''Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing''. 1996.</ref> He introduced a family of one-way functions based on SIS and showed that SIS is hard to solve on average if a version of the [[wikipedia:Lattice_problem#Shortest_vector_problem_(SVP)|shortest vector problem]] is hard in a worst-case scenario.
Short Integer Solution (SIS) is an average-case problem, which was introduced in 1996 by Miklós Ajtai.<ref name=":0">Ajtai, Miklós. [https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/237814.237838 Generating hard instances of lattice problems]. ''Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing''. 1996.</ref> He introduced a family of one-way functions based on SIS and showed that SIS is hard to solve on average if a version of the [[wikipedia:Lattice_problem#Shortest_vector_problem_(SVP)|shortest vector problem]] is hard in a worst-case scenario.


== Formal Definition ==
== Formal Definition ==
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Let matrix <math>\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}</math> be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector <math>\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math>satisfying <math>\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{0} \bmod q \land 0 < \lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math>.
Let matrix <math>\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}</math> be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector <math>\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math>satisfying <math>\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{0} \bmod q \land 0 < \lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math>.


A solution to SIS without the condition <math>\lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math> can be found using Gaussian elimination. Thus, the condition <math>\beta < q</math> is required as otherwise <math>(q, 0,\dots,0) \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math> is a trivial solution.
A solution to SIS without the condition <math>\lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math> can be found using [[wikipedia:Gaussian_elimination|Gaussian elimination]]. Thus, the condition <math>\beta < q</math> is required as otherwise <math>(q, 0,\dots,0) \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math> is a trivial solution.
 
== Versions of SIS ==


=== ISIS<sub>n,m,q,β</sub> - Inhomogeneous SIS <code>EQUIVALENT</code> ===
=== ISIS<sub>n,m,q,β</sub> - Inhomogeneous SIS <code>EQUIVALENT</code> ===
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Let matrix <math>\bar{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m-n}</math> be chosen uniformly at random and define <math>\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{I}_n &\bar{\mathbf{A}} \end{bmatrix}</math>. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector <math>\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math>satisfying <math>\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{t} \bmod q \land 0 < \lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math>.
Let matrix <math>\bar{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m-n}</math> be chosen uniformly at random and define <math>\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{I}_n &\bar{\mathbf{A}} \end{bmatrix}</math>. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector <math>\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math>satisfying <math>\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{t} \bmod q \land 0 < \lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math>.


TODO
Normal Form SIS is related to the Hermite normal form of a uniformly random matrix <math>\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}</math>. The normal form version of SIS is often used to reduce public key sizes by size <math>n</math> as the static part of the matrix, the identity matrix <math>\mathbf{I}_n</math>, can be omitted for data transmission.
 
A SIS instance can be reduced to a NFSIS instance if the first <math>n
</math> columns of its challenge matrix <math>\mathbf{A}</math> are invertible over <math>\mathbb{Z}_q</math>. Assuming this is the case, denote the first <math>n</math> columns of <math>\mathbf{A}</math> by <math>\mathbf{A}_0</math> and define the NFSIS challenge matrix by <math>\mathbf{A}_0^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{A}</math>. Then, any solution of the NFSIS instance is a solution of the SIS instance and vice versa.
 
=== Further versions ===
 
* SIS with infinity norm<ref name=":1">Lyubashevsky, Vadim. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/537.pdf Lattice signatures without trapdoors]. ''Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques''. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.</ref>
* Decision SIS<ref name=":1" />


== Analysis of Assumption ==
== Analysis of Assumption ==
List of Reductions from other problems as well as cryptanalysis performed on SIS. Answer: Why is this problem hard to solve for a (quantum) computer / why should anyone believe that it is hard?
The initial hardness results of Ajtai<ref name=":0" /> in 1996 were later refined by a series of works<ref>Micciancio, Daniele, and Oded Regev. [https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539705447360 Worst-case to average-case reductions based on Gaussian measures]. ''SIAM journal on computing'' 37.1 (2007): 267-302.</ref><ref name=":2">Gentry, Craig, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/432.pdf Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions]. ''Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing''. 2008.</ref><ref>Micciancio, Daniele, and Chris Peikert. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/069.pdf Hardness of SIS and LWE with small parameters]. ''Annual cryptology conference''. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.</ref>. All results follow are instances of the following theorem.
 
'''Theorem'''<ref name=":3">Peikert, Chris. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/939.pdf A decade of lattice cryptography]. ''Foundations and trends® in theoretical computer science'' 10.4 (2016): 283-424.</ref> For any m = poly(n), any β > 0, and any sufficiently large q ≥ β · poly(n), solving SIS<sub>n,m,,q,β</sub>  with non-negligible probability is at least as hard as solving the decisional approximate shortest vector problem GapSVP<sub>γ</sub> and the approximate shortest independent vectors problems SIVP<sub>γ</sub> (among others) on arbitrary n-dimensional lattices (i.e., in the worst case) with overwhelming probability, for some γ = β · poly(n).


== Constructions based on SIS ==
== Constructions based on SIS ==
List of constructions built from SIS (with non-extensive list of citations)
This is a non-exhaustive list of constructions, whose security is or can be based on SIS (or R-SIS and M-SIS).


* Signatures
* One-way function<ref name=":0" />
* (Vector) Commitments
* Collision-resistant hash function
* Preimage Sampleable Function<ref name=":2" />
* Signatures<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref>Boyen, Xavier. [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-13013-7_29 Lattice mixing and vanishing trapdoors: A framework for fully secure short signatures and more]. ''International workshop on public key cryptography''. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.</ref>
* Commitments<ref>Baum, Carsten, et al. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/997.pdf More efficient commitments from structured lattice assumptions]. ''International conference on security and cryptography for networks''. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.</ref><ref>Lyubashevsky, Vadim, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, and Maxime Plançon. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/284.pdf Lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs and applications: shorter, simpler, and more general]. ''Annual International Cryptology Conference''. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022.</ref>
* Vector and Functional Commitments<ref>Peikert, Chris, Zachary Pepin, and Chad Sharp. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1254.pdf Vector and functional commitments from lattices]. ''Theory of Cryptography Conference''. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021.</ref>


== Related Assumptions ==
== Related Assumptions ==


* k-SIS
* Approximate SIS
* List of closely related assumptions - either because there is a reduction from
* Learning with Errors


== See also ==
== Further reading suggestions ==


* Space to list links which should be of further interest for people interested in SIS
* [https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/939.pdf#page=20 Section 4.1] in "A decade of lattice cryptography"<ref name=":3" /> can help providing an intuition about SIS
* TODO - Discussion about NFSIS


== References ==
== References ==

Revision as of 11:09, 24 July 2025

Short Integer Solution (SIS) is an average-case problem, which was introduced in 1996 by Miklós Ajtai.[1] He introduced a family of one-way functions based on SIS and showed that SIS is hard to solve on average if a version of the shortest vector problem is hard in a worst-case scenario.

Formal Definition

SISn,m,q,β STANDARD

Let matrix 𝐀qn×m be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector 𝐬msatisfying 𝐀𝐬=𝟎modq0<𝐬β.

A solution to SIS without the condition 𝐬β can be found using Gaussian elimination. Thus, the condition β<q is required as otherwise (q,0,,0)m is a trivial solution.

Versions of SIS

ISISn,m,q,β - Inhomogeneous SIS EQUIVALENT

Let matrix 𝐀qn×mand target vector 𝐭qn be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short vector 𝐬msatisfying 𝐀𝐬=𝐭modq𝐬β.

The inhomogeneous version of SIS introduces a target vector 𝐭qn, which is chosen uniformly at random. The probability of ending up in the homogeneous case with 𝐭=𝟎 happens with probability qn, which allows removing the condition of 𝐬 being non-zero.

ISIS is as hard as SIS. A SIS instance can be reduced to ISIS using the last column of 𝐀 as target vector for ISIS. Any solution 𝐬m1 to the ISIS instance with challenge matrix 𝐀[1:m1] and target vector 𝐚m yields a valid SIS solution (𝐬T,1)m of slightly larger norm. The reduction from ISIS to SIS requires index guessing a non-zero entry in the SIS solution and embedding the target vector at this position in the challenge matrix 𝐀.

NFSISn,m,q,β - Normal Form SIS EQUIVALENT

Let matrix 𝐀¯qn×mn be chosen uniformly at random and define 𝐀=[𝐈n𝐀¯]. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector 𝐬msatisfying 𝐀𝐬=𝐭modq0<𝐬β.

Normal Form SIS is related to the Hermite normal form of a uniformly random matrix 𝐀qn×m. The normal form version of SIS is often used to reduce public key sizes by size n as the static part of the matrix, the identity matrix 𝐈n, can be omitted for data transmission.

A SIS instance can be reduced to a NFSIS instance if the first n columns of its challenge matrix 𝐀 are invertible over q. Assuming this is the case, denote the first n columns of 𝐀 by 𝐀0 and define the NFSIS challenge matrix by 𝐀01𝐀. Then, any solution of the NFSIS instance is a solution of the SIS instance and vice versa.

Further versions

  • SIS with infinity norm[2]
  • Decision SIS[2]

Analysis of Assumption

The initial hardness results of Ajtai[1] in 1996 were later refined by a series of works[3][4][5]. All results follow are instances of the following theorem.

Theorem[6] For any m = poly(n), any β > 0, and any sufficiently large q ≥ β · poly(n), solving SISn,m,,q,β with non-negligible probability is at least as hard as solving the decisional approximate shortest vector problem GapSVPγ and the approximate shortest independent vectors problems SIVPγ (among others) on arbitrary n-dimensional lattices (i.e., in the worst case) with overwhelming probability, for some γ = β · poly(n).

Constructions based on SIS

This is a non-exhaustive list of constructions, whose security is or can be based on SIS (or R-SIS and M-SIS).

  • One-way function[1]
  • Collision-resistant hash function
  • Preimage Sampleable Function[4]
  • Signatures[2][4][7]
  • Commitments[8][9]
  • Vector and Functional Commitments[10]

Related Assumptions

  • Approximate SIS
  • Learning with Errors

Further reading suggestions

  • Section 4.1 in "A decade of lattice cryptography"[6] can help providing an intuition about SIS
  • TODO - Discussion about NFSIS

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 Ajtai, Miklós. Generating hard instances of lattice problems. Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. 1996.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 Lyubashevsky, Vadim. Lattice signatures without trapdoors. Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
  3. Micciancio, Daniele, and Oded Regev. Worst-case to average-case reductions based on Gaussian measures. SIAM journal on computing 37.1 (2007): 267-302.
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 Gentry, Craig, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions. Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. 2008.
  5. Micciancio, Daniele, and Chris Peikert. Hardness of SIS and LWE with small parameters. Annual cryptology conference. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
  6. 6.0 6.1 Peikert, Chris. A decade of lattice cryptography. Foundations and trends® in theoretical computer science 10.4 (2016): 283-424.
  7. Boyen, Xavier. Lattice mixing and vanishing trapdoors: A framework for fully secure short signatures and more. International workshop on public key cryptography. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
  8. Baum, Carsten, et al. More efficient commitments from structured lattice assumptions. International conference on security and cryptography for networks. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.
  9. Lyubashevsky, Vadim, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, and Maxime Plançon. Lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs and applications: shorter, simpler, and more general. Annual International Cryptology Conference. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022.
  10. Peikert, Chris, Zachary Pepin, and Chad Sharp. Vector and functional commitments from lattices. Theory of Cryptography Conference. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021.