Short Integer Solution: Difference between revisions
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Short Integer Solution (SIS) is an average-case problem, which was introduced in 1996 by Miklós Ajtai.<ref>Ajtai, Miklós. [https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/237814.237838 Generating hard instances of lattice problems]. ''Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing''. 1996.</ref> He introduced a family of one-way functions based on SIS and showed that SIS is hard to solve on average if a version of the [[wikipedia:Lattice_problem#Shortest_vector_problem_(SVP)|shortest vector problem]] is hard in a worst-case scenario. | Short Integer Solution (SIS) is an average-case problem, which was introduced in 1996 by Miklós Ajtai.<ref name=":0">Ajtai, Miklós. [https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/237814.237838 Generating hard instances of lattice problems]. ''Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing''. 1996.</ref> He introduced a family of one-way functions based on SIS and showed that SIS is hard to solve on average if a version of the [[wikipedia:Lattice_problem#Shortest_vector_problem_(SVP)|shortest vector problem]] is hard in a worst-case scenario. | ||
== Formal Definition == | == Formal Definition == | ||
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Let matrix <math>\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}</math> be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector <math>\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math>satisfying <math>\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{0} \bmod q \land 0 < \lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math>. | Let matrix <math>\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}</math> be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector <math>\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math>satisfying <math>\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{0} \bmod q \land 0 < \lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math>. | ||
A solution to SIS without the condition <math>\lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math> can be found using Gaussian elimination. Thus, the condition <math>\beta < q</math> is required as otherwise <math>(q, 0,\dots,0) \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math> is a trivial solution. | A solution to SIS without the condition <math>\lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math> can be found using [[wikipedia:Gaussian_elimination|Gaussian elimination]]. Thus, the condition <math>\beta < q</math> is required as otherwise <math>(q, 0,\dots,0) \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math> is a trivial solution. | ||
== Versions of SIS == | |||
=== ISIS<sub>n,m,q,β</sub> - Inhomogeneous SIS <code>EQUIVALENT</code> === | === ISIS<sub>n,m,q,β</sub> - Inhomogeneous SIS <code>EQUIVALENT</code> === | ||
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Let matrix <math>\bar{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m-n}</math> be chosen uniformly at random and define <math>\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{I}_n &\bar{\mathbf{A}} \end{bmatrix}</math>. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector <math>\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math>satisfying <math>\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{t} \bmod q \land 0 < \lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math>. | Let matrix <math>\bar{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m-n}</math> be chosen uniformly at random and define <math>\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{I}_n &\bar{\mathbf{A}} \end{bmatrix}</math>. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector <math>\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^m</math>satisfying <math>\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{t} \bmod q \land 0 < \lVert \mathbf{s} \rVert \leq \beta</math>. | ||
Normal Form SIS is related to the Hermite normal form of a uniformly random matrix <math>\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}</math>. The normal form version of SIS is often used to reduce public key sizes by size <math>n</math> as the static part of the matrix, the identity matrix <math>\mathbf{I}_n</math>, can be omitted for data transmission. | |||
A SIS instance can be reduced to a NFSIS instance if the first <math>n | |||
</math> columns of its challenge matrix <math>\mathbf{A}</math> are invertible over <math>\mathbb{Z}_q</math>. Assuming this is the case, denote the first <math>n</math> columns of <math>\mathbf{A}</math> by <math>\mathbf{A}_0</math> and define the NFSIS challenge matrix by <math>\mathbf{A}_0^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{A}</math>. Then, any solution of the NFSIS instance is a solution of the SIS instance and vice versa. | |||
=== Further versions === | |||
* SIS with infinity norm<ref name=":1">Lyubashevsky, Vadim. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/537.pdf Lattice signatures without trapdoors]. ''Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques''. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.</ref> | |||
* Decision SIS<ref name=":1" /> | |||
== Analysis of Assumption == | == Analysis of Assumption == | ||
The initial hardness results of Ajtai<ref name=":0" /> in 1996 were later refined by a series of works<ref>Micciancio, Daniele, and Oded Regev. [https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539705447360 Worst-case to average-case reductions based on Gaussian measures]. ''SIAM journal on computing'' 37.1 (2007): 267-302.</ref><ref name=":2">Gentry, Craig, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/432.pdf Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions]. ''Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing''. 2008.</ref><ref>Micciancio, Daniele, and Chris Peikert. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/069.pdf Hardness of SIS and LWE with small parameters]. ''Annual cryptology conference''. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.</ref>. All results follow are instances of the following theorem. | |||
'''Theorem'''<ref name=":3">Peikert, Chris. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/939.pdf A decade of lattice cryptography]. ''Foundations and trends® in theoretical computer science'' 10.4 (2016): 283-424.</ref> For any m = poly(n), any β > 0, and any sufficiently large q ≥ β · poly(n), solving SIS<sub>n,m,,q,β</sub> with non-negligible probability is at least as hard as solving the decisional approximate shortest vector problem GapSVP<sub>γ</sub> and the approximate shortest independent vectors problems SIVP<sub>γ</sub> (among others) on arbitrary n-dimensional lattices (i.e., in the worst case) with overwhelming probability, for some γ = β · poly(n). | |||
== Constructions based on SIS == | == Constructions based on SIS == | ||
This is a non-exhaustive list of constructions, whose security is or can be based on SIS (or R-SIS and M-SIS). | |||
* Signatures | * One-way function<ref name=":0" /> | ||
* | * Collision-resistant hash function | ||
* Preimage Sampleable Function<ref name=":2" /> | |||
* Signatures<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref>Boyen, Xavier. [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-13013-7_29 Lattice mixing and vanishing trapdoors: A framework for fully secure short signatures and more]. ''International workshop on public key cryptography''. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.</ref> | |||
* Commitments<ref>Baum, Carsten, et al. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/997.pdf More efficient commitments from structured lattice assumptions]. ''International conference on security and cryptography for networks''. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.</ref><ref>Lyubashevsky, Vadim, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, and Maxime Plançon. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/284.pdf Lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs and applications: shorter, simpler, and more general]. ''Annual International Cryptology Conference''. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022.</ref> | |||
* Vector and Functional Commitments<ref>Peikert, Chris, Zachary Pepin, and Chad Sharp. [https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1254.pdf Vector and functional commitments from lattices]. ''Theory of Cryptography Conference''. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021.</ref> | |||
== Related Assumptions == | == Related Assumptions == | ||
* | * Approximate SIS | ||
* | * Learning with Errors | ||
== | == Further reading suggestions == | ||
* | * [https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/939.pdf#page=20 Section 4.1] in "A decade of lattice cryptography"<ref name=":3" /> can help providing an intuition about SIS | ||
* TODO - Discussion about NFSIS | |||
== References == | == References == |
Revision as of 11:09, 24 July 2025
Short Integer Solution (SIS) is an average-case problem, which was introduced in 1996 by Miklós Ajtai.[1] He introduced a family of one-way functions based on SIS and showed that SIS is hard to solve on average if a version of the shortest vector problem is hard in a worst-case scenario.
Formal Definition
SISn,m,q,β STANDARD
Let matrix be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector satisfying .
A solution to SIS without the condition can be found using Gaussian elimination. Thus, the condition is required as otherwise is a trivial solution.
Versions of SIS
ISISn,m,q,β - Inhomogeneous SIS EQUIVALENT
Let matrix and target vector be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short vector satisfying .
The inhomogeneous version of SIS introduces a target vector , which is chosen uniformly at random. The probability of ending up in the homogeneous case with happens with probability , which allows removing the condition of being non-zero.
ISIS is as hard as SIS. A SIS instance can be reduced to ISIS using the last column of as target vector for ISIS. Any solution to the ISIS instance with challenge matrix and target vector yields a valid SIS solution of slightly larger norm. The reduction from ISIS to SIS requires index guessing a non-zero entry in the SIS solution and embedding the target vector at this position in the challenge matrix .
NFSISn,m,q,β - Normal Form SIS EQUIVALENT
Let matrix be chosen uniformly at random and define . An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector satisfying .
Normal Form SIS is related to the Hermite normal form of a uniformly random matrix . The normal form version of SIS is often used to reduce public key sizes by size as the static part of the matrix, the identity matrix , can be omitted for data transmission.
A SIS instance can be reduced to a NFSIS instance if the first columns of its challenge matrix are invertible over . Assuming this is the case, denote the first columns of by and define the NFSIS challenge matrix by . Then, any solution of the NFSIS instance is a solution of the SIS instance and vice versa.
Further versions
Analysis of Assumption
The initial hardness results of Ajtai[1] in 1996 were later refined by a series of works[3][4][5]. All results follow are instances of the following theorem.
Theorem[6] For any m = poly(n), any β > 0, and any sufficiently large q ≥ β · poly(n), solving SISn,m,,q,β with non-negligible probability is at least as hard as solving the decisional approximate shortest vector problem GapSVPγ and the approximate shortest independent vectors problems SIVPγ (among others) on arbitrary n-dimensional lattices (i.e., in the worst case) with overwhelming probability, for some γ = β · poly(n).
Constructions based on SIS
This is a non-exhaustive list of constructions, whose security is or can be based on SIS (or R-SIS and M-SIS).
- One-way function[1]
- Collision-resistant hash function
- Preimage Sampleable Function[4]
- Signatures[2][4][7]
- Commitments[8][9]
- Vector and Functional Commitments[10]
Related Assumptions
- Approximate SIS
- Learning with Errors
Further reading suggestions
- Section 4.1 in "A decade of lattice cryptography"[6] can help providing an intuition about SIS
- TODO - Discussion about NFSIS
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Ajtai, Miklós. Generating hard instances of lattice problems. Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. 1996.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Lyubashevsky, Vadim. Lattice signatures without trapdoors. Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
- ↑ Micciancio, Daniele, and Oded Regev. Worst-case to average-case reductions based on Gaussian measures. SIAM journal on computing 37.1 (2007): 267-302.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 Gentry, Craig, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions. Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. 2008.
- ↑ Micciancio, Daniele, and Chris Peikert. Hardness of SIS and LWE with small parameters. Annual cryptology conference. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Peikert, Chris. A decade of lattice cryptography. Foundations and trends® in theoretical computer science 10.4 (2016): 283-424.
- ↑ Boyen, Xavier. Lattice mixing and vanishing trapdoors: A framework for fully secure short signatures and more. International workshop on public key cryptography. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
- ↑ Baum, Carsten, et al. More efficient commitments from structured lattice assumptions. International conference on security and cryptography for networks. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.
- ↑ Lyubashevsky, Vadim, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, and Maxime Plançon. Lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs and applications: shorter, simpler, and more general. Annual International Cryptology Conference. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022.
- ↑ Peikert, Chris, Zachary Pepin, and Chad Sharp. Vector and functional commitments from lattices. Theory of Cryptography Conference. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021.