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Short Integer Solution

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Short Integer Solution (SIS) is an average-case problem, which was introduced in 1996 by Miklós Ajtai.[1] He introduced a family of one-way functions based on SIS and showed that SIS is hard to solve on average if a version of the shortest vector problem is hard in a worst-case scenario.

Formal Definition

SISn,m,q,β STANDARD

Let matrix 𝐀qn×m be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector 𝐬msatisfying 𝐀𝐬=𝟎modq0<𝐬β.

SIS intuitively states that it is hard to find a short vector in the kernel of matrix 𝐀.

A solution to SIS without the condition 𝐬β can be found using Gaussian elimination. Thus, the condition β<q is required as otherwise (q,0,,0)m is a trivial solution.

Versions of SIS

ISISn,m,q,β - Inhomogeneous SIS EQUIVALENT

Let matrix 𝐀qn×mand target vector 𝐭qn be chosen uniformly at random. An adversary is asked to find a short vector 𝐬m satisfying 𝐀𝐬=𝐭modq𝐬β.

The inhomogeneous version of SIS introduces a target vector 𝐭qn, which is chosen uniformly at random. The probability of ending up in the homogeneous case with 𝐭=𝟎 happens with probability qn, which allows removing the condition of 𝐬 being non-zero.

ISIS is as hard as SIS. A SIS instance can be reduced to ISIS using the last column of 𝐀 as target vector for ISIS. Any solution 𝐬m1 to the ISIS instance with challenge matrix 𝐀[1:m1] and target vector 𝐚m yields a valid SIS solution (𝐬T,1)m of slightly larger norm. The reduction from ISIS to SIS requires index guessing a non-zero entry in the SIS solution and embedding the target vector at this position in the challenge matrix 𝐀.

NFSISn,m,q,β - Normal Form SIS EQUIVALENT

Let matrix 𝐀¯qn×mn be chosen uniformly at random and define 𝐀=[𝐈n𝐀¯]. An adversary is asked to find a short non-zero vector 𝐬msatisfying 𝐀𝐬=𝐭modq0<𝐬β.

Normal Form SIS is related to the Hermite normal form of a uniformly random matrix 𝐀qn×m. The normal form version of SIS is often used to reduce public key sizes by size n as the static part of the matrix, the identity matrix 𝐈n, can be omitted for data transmission.

A SIS instance can be reduced to a NFSIS instance if the first n columns of its challenge matrix 𝐀 are invertible over q. Assuming this is the case, denote the first n columns of 𝐀 by 𝐀0 and define the NFSIS challenge matrix by 𝐀01𝐀. Then, any solution of the NFSIS instance is a solution of the SIS instance and vice versa.

Further versions

  • SIS with infinity norm[2]
  • Decision SIS[2]

Hardness of SIS

The initial hardness results of Ajtai[1] in 1996 were later refined by a series of works[3][4][5]. All results follow are instances of the following theorem.

Theorem[6] For any m = poly(n), any β > 0, and any sufficiently large q ≥ β · poly(n), solving SISn,m,q,β with non-negligible probability is at least as hard as solving the decisional approximate shortest vector problem GapSVPγ and the approximate shortest independent vectors problems SIVPγ (among others) on arbitrary n-dimensional lattices (i.e., in the worst case) with overwhelming probability, for some γ = β · poly(n).

Constructions based on SIS

This is a non-exhaustive list of constructions, whose security is or can be based on SIS (or R-SIS and M-SIS).

  • One-way function[1]
  • Collision-resistant hash function
  • Preimage Sampleable Function[4]
  • Signatures[2][4][7]
  • Commitments[8][9]
  • Vector and Functional Commitments[10]

Related Assumptions

Further reading suggestions

  • Section 4.1 in A decade of lattice cryptography[6] can help providing further intuition about SIS
  • TODO - Discussion about NFSIS

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 Ajtai, Miklós. Generating hard instances of lattice problems. Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. 1996.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 Lyubashevsky, Vadim. Lattice signatures without trapdoors. Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
  3. Micciancio, Daniele, and Oded Regev. Worst-case to average-case reductions based on Gaussian measures. SIAM journal on computing 37.1 (2007): 267-302.
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 Gentry, Craig, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions. Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. 2008.
  5. Micciancio, Daniele, and Chris Peikert. Hardness of SIS and LWE with small parameters. Annual cryptology conference. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
  6. 6.0 6.1 Peikert, Chris. A decade of lattice cryptography. Foundations and trends® in theoretical computer science 10.4 (2016): 283-424.
  7. Boyen, Xavier. Lattice mixing and vanishing trapdoors: A framework for fully secure short signatures and more. International workshop on public key cryptography. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.
  8. Baum, Carsten, et al. More efficient commitments from structured lattice assumptions. International conference on security and cryptography for networks. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.
  9. Lyubashevsky, Vadim, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, and Maxime Plançon. Lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs and applications: shorter, simpler, and more general. Annual International Cryptology Conference. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022.
  10. Peikert, Chris, Zachary Pepin, and Chad Sharp. Vector and functional commitments from lattices. Theory of Cryptography Conference. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021.