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ISISf

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The ISISf assumption was introduced by Bootle, Lyubashevsky, Nguyen, and Sorniotti in 2023.[1] It introduces a function f that removes the requirement of a static target vector and passes additional hints to the adversary.

Formal Definition

ISISf

Let (n,m,d,q,β,k,s,N) be public parameters, matrix 𝐀qn×m be chosen uniformly at random and f be a specified function f:[N]qn. The challenger generates k hints (xi,𝐬i) in the following way.

  • xi[N]
  • 𝐬i𝐀s1(f(xi))

Given the matrix 𝐀, the function f, and the set of hints {(xi,𝐬i)}i[k], the adversary is asked to find a new tuple (x*,𝐬*)[N]×m satisfying 𝐀𝐬*=f(x*)modq0<𝐬*β(x*,𝐬*){(xi,𝐬i)i[k]}.

Intuition. ISISf essentially expects the adversary to either successfully solve ISIS or compute a preimage of the function f. Thus, the hardness of ISISf depends on the choice of f. We list few examples for insecure choices of f.

  • Additively homomorphic functions imply trivial solutions by adding or subtracting two hints.
  • Any efficiently invertible function using public information enables choosing 𝐬*m short and finding a preimage of 𝐀𝐬*.
  • Assume f is a linear function and the domain of f was mapped to N. Then, any hint (xi,𝐬i) can be used to generate a valid ISISf solution (xi,𝐬i).

Interactive ISISf

TODO

Hardness of ISISf and its interactive version

TODO

Constructions based on ISISf

Bootle et al.[1] provide a framework to generically build the following constructions from any ISISf instance.

Related Assumptions

  • Generalised ISISf
  • One-More-ISIS
  • Randomised One-More-ISIS

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Bootle, Jonathan, et al. A framework for practical anonymous credentials from lattices. Annual International Cryptology Conference. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023.
  2. 2.0 2.1 Lyubashevsky, Vadim, Gregor Seiler, and Patrick Steuer. The LaZer library: Lattice-based zero knowledge and succinct proofs for quantum-safe privacy. Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2024.