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k-SIS

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The k-SIS assumption was introduced in 2011 by Boneh and Freeman[1]. The assumption hands out k hints additionally to the SIS challenge matrix restricting the solution space by any linear combination of these hints.

Formal Definition

k-SISn,m,d,q,β,s

Let matrix 𝐀qn×m be chosen uniformly at random and k hint vectors 𝐬i from DΛq(𝐀),s with 𝐬i. Given 𝐀 and {𝐬i}i[k], an adversary is asked to find a new short non-zero vector 𝐬*m satisfying 𝒜𝐬*=𝟎modq𝐬*β𝐬*𝒦span({𝐬i}i[k]).

The provided definition is the module-variant, which was defined by Albrecht et al.[2] The original version can be recovered by setting = and 𝒦=.

Intuitively, k-SIS asks for a SIS solution that is not a linear combination of the provided hints.

Hardness of k-SIS

k-SIS (over ) is at least as hard as SIS. Boneh and Freeman[1] proved this result for constant k𝒪(1) and Ling et al.[3] improved this result to k𝒪(m).

TODO - Provide intuition of reduction

Constructions based on k-SIS

  • Linearly homomorphic signatures[1]

Related Assumptions

  • k-LWE

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 Boneh, Dan, and David Mandell Freeman. Linearly homomorphic signatures over binary fields and new tools for lattice-based signatures. International Workshop on Public Key Cryptography. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
  2. Albrecht, Martin R., et al. Lattice-based SNARKs: publicly verifiable, preprocessing, and recursively composable. Annual International Cryptology Conference. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022.
  3. Ling, S., Phan, D.H., Stehlé, D. and Steinfeld, R. Hardness of k-LWE and applications in traitor tracing. Algorithmica 79.4 (2017): 1318-1352.