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k-SIS

From Lattice Assumption Zoo
Revision as of 10:12, 26 July 2025 by Jnsiemer (talk | contribs) (First draft)

The k-SIS assumption was introduced in 2011 by Boneh and Freeman[1]. The assumption hands out k hints additionally to the SIS challenge matrix restricting the solution space by any linear combination of these hints.

Formal Definition

k-SISn,m,d,q,β,s

Let matrix 𝐀qn×m be chosen uniformly at random and k hint vectors 𝐬i from DΛq(𝐀),s with 𝐬i. Given 𝐀 and {𝐬i}i[k], an adversary is asked to find a new short non-zero vector 𝐬*m satisfying 𝒜𝐬*=𝟎modq𝐬*β𝐬*𝒦span({𝐬i}i[k]).

The provided definition is the module-variant, which was defined by Albrecht et al.[2] The original version can be recovered by setting = and 𝒦=.

Intuitively, k-SIS asks for a SIS solution that is not a linear combination of the provided hints.

The condition 𝐬*𝒦span({𝐬i}i[k]) can be dropped when k<m1/4 as then the probability that there is an additional short vector in the k-dimensional sublattice spanned by {𝐬i}i[k] is negligible.[1]

Hardness of k-SIS

k-SISn,m,q,β,s (over ) is at least as hard as SISn,m-k,q,β'. Boneh and Freeman[1] proved this result for constant k𝒪(1) and Ling et al.[3] improved this result to k𝒪(m).

The initial proof[1] relies on the following observation. Let 𝐀qn×m1,𝐞Dm1,s, and em a short q-invertible entry. Define 𝐀=[𝐀𝐀𝐞em1] and 𝐞=[𝐞em]. Then, 𝐀𝐞=𝐀𝐞𝐀𝐞em1em=𝟎. In this way, the proof embeds a hint for each added column to the challenge matrix. Embedding multiple hints and recovering a SIS solution requires several technical details, which we omit here.

No proof was provided for the module variant.

Constructions based on k-SIS

  • Linearly homomorphic signatures[1]
  • k-time GPV signatures in the standard model[1]

Related Assumptions

  • k-LWE

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Boneh, Dan, and David Mandell Freeman. Linearly homomorphic signatures over binary fields and new tools for lattice-based signatures. International Workshop on Public Key Cryptography. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
  2. Albrecht, M.R., Cini, V., Lai, R.W., Malavolta, G. and Thyagarajan, S.A. Lattice-based SNARKs: publicly verifiable, preprocessing, and recursively composable. Annual International Cryptology Conference. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2022.
  3. Ling, S., Phan, D.H., Stehlé, D. and Steinfeld, R. Hardness of k-LWE and applications in traitor tracing. Algorithmica 79.4 (2017): 1318-1352.